Why China needs to reconsider its strategy vis-a-vis the Myanmar Junta
The multidimensional crises in Myanmar actually impinge on the fundamental interests of China in the region, calling for a more robust involvement of China rather than vacuous rhetoric
On 26 September, in a meeting with the acting foreign secretary of Bangladesh, the Chinese ambassador reassured Bangladesh that it would press Myanmar to halt the violation of territorial sovereignty, and pledged to expedite the tripartite mechanism of Rohingya repatriation.
Such a positive posture from the Chinese ambassador is welcoming to Bangladesh.
Ever since the persecution of the Rohingya communities led to a monumental refugee crisis, China has bolstered Myanmar to cushion the latter from international opprobrium and outcries. Due to the unflinching support of China, Myanmar largely averted international action. China's support for Myanmar and its numerous international infringements stems from the prudent geopolitical calculation of the country.
China seeks to leverage Myanmar to facilitate its broader geopolitical and strategic goals. The geostrategic position of Myanmar, girding the Indian Ocean, is consequential for China on several grounds.
Firstly, it consolidates China's energy security. As a country that is reliant on oil imports, China needs to depend on an alternative route and sees Myanmar as a conduit of oil export to China.
Secondly, the Malacca strait is dominated by the United States, posing threats to China in the event of future conflict, as any whimsical blocking of the strait will deal a severe blow to China's energy imports.
Besides, underpinned by harmonious state-to-state ties, both public and private Chinese economic investments thrived in Myanmar in previous decades. As a result, the Chinese government has demonstrated an inclination to safeguard this harmonious dynamic of bilateral ties.
To maintain its firm hold on the politics of Myanmar, the Chinese government has been guided by an instrumentalist disposition rather than an idealistic one. Rather than bolster any particular political movement or group, the Chinese government retains its hold on the state apparatus of Myanmar through maintaining a liaison with both fundamental political actors and ethnic armed organisations.
The deposed National League for Democracy had harmonious ties with Myanmar, which had been cemented due to a series of bilateral state visits between the two countries that placated the historical tensions that had once roiled bilateral ties.
Hence, in the wake of the putsch in Myanmar, the Chinese government was circumspect and refrained from taking any decisive stand. Nonetheless, grasping the importance of maintaining a semblance of bilateral ties, China made overtures to the junta government.
For instance, during the visit of Myanmar's foreign minister to the Anhui province of China, the latter expressed its unequivocal support for the junta government.
This disheartened the shadow government of Myanmar, which purports to be the sole legitimate government of Myanmar, and evoked their condemnation.
There is a deep reservoir of anti-China sentiment in Myanmar, as the local population perceives China as an intruder. Hence, China sought to maintain a close liaison with the governing elites of Myanmar to exert a modicum of power in the country.
These parochial geostrategic considerations compelled China to remain aloof in the face of a pressing humanitarian crisis, violence, territorial incursions, and a plunge into political morass.
Nonetheless, the multidimensional crises in Myanmar actually impinge on the fundamental interests of China in the region, calling for a more robust involvement of China rather than vacuous rhetoric.
The crisis in Myanmar is imperceptibly mutating into a regional crisis, with considerable ramifications for the region and beyond. While the raging Ukraine crisis allowed little bandwidth for the crisis in Myanmar, it nonetheless has profound implications for the wider region and is poised to ripple across the volatile region with ominous repercussions.
As the war in Ukraine adequately demonstrates, no crisis remains confined to only one given country, but rather, reverberates across the world, evoking hurdles for all nations.
A plausible conflict scenario will severely undermine the interest of China in the region, as China has a series of infrastructure projects in Myanmar.
Hence, facilitating stability is in the interest of China, and due to China's close liaison with the stakeholders of the crisis, China exerts considerable sway over the process of reconciliation and the restoration of stability.
As has been demonstrated from the power tussle of previous months, a dichotomous power struggle has emerged in Myanmar. The hold of the junta over the levers of power has become increasingly challenged by the country's numerous fringe movements.
Thus, coordinated political action by the junta, as well as the increasing military backlash against them, points to the fact that the junta is in a precarious position in Myanmar, susceptible to any future upheaval.
After perceiving the perils emanating from the National Unity Government, the defiant junta launched a series of incursions on Bangladesh, in conspicuous violation of international law.
In this context, China should not bet on a declining junta, rather, it should ally with the alternative shadow government, which represents the legitimate aspirations of the country.
This is important for two reasons. Firstly, this will placate the surging anti-China sentiments in Myanmar, which will allow China a conducive condition for projecting its interests.
Secondly, in the event of a future toppling of the junta, the Chinese authorities can deepen their ties with the alternative government.
Mehjabin Maliha Hossain is an international affairs researcher and pursuing her doctoral studies at National University of Singapore (NUS). Her doctoral thesis concerns the international dimensions of the Rohingya crisis.