BRICS 2026: Implications for a multipolar world

Recently, the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot made an interesting observation: France heads the G7 while India chairs BRICS in 2026, offering a unique possibility for cooperation. Both countries subscribe to this view. President Macron further underscored, "India is going to be President of BRICS. I want to work with India to build bridges. BRICS countries must not become anti-G7 and G7 must not become anti-BRICS."

This recognises the growing heft of BRICS and the need for collaborative rather than conflictual approaches. There is a real convergence possibility here. While the G7 dominates global finance, technology, and high value-added services, BRICS is the pivot for commodities, consumption, and manufacturing.

This sentiment is significant because unilateralism has become the major currency in international discourse, evidenced by recent regime changes and US withdrawals from international agreements. The Transatlantic alliance is also under stress. Hence, the desire for cross-regional connections is not surprising.

India, being a founding member of both BRICS and the Quad – ostensibly on opposing ends of the spectrum – believes that BRICS is not anti-West but a non-Western alternative. It represents the aspirations of the Global South, with China and Russia as P-5 members. India acts as a bridge between these divergent groupings, attempting to span the East-West and North-South divides.

Since Jim O'Neill coined the term, the group has grown from four nations to ten, incorporating middle powers like the UAE, Iran, and Egypt. At the Kazan summit, a new "partner country" category was created to accommodate the two dozen nations expressing a desire to join.

BRICS now represents nearly half the world's population and roughly 40% of global GDP. Despite politically and economically divergent systems – ranging from democracies to authoritarian states – the group believes in mutual respect and opposes external dictation.

As Chair in 2026, India will host the BRICS Summit. A key quest for the bloc is the urgent reform of global institutions, particularly the UN Security Council, which risks irrelevance by clinging to a post-World War II mindset.

Furthermore, the weaponisation of financial instruments has become a major point of contention. For the US administration, tariffs and sanctions are key tools; for the original BRICS members – all of whom are in the crosshairs of US trade policy – these are threats to stability.

BRICS is trying to provide a viable alternative bereft of dominance. It challenges Western hegemony by providing a cooperative landscape and institutions like the New Development Bank. While India remains unconvinced about a common BRICS currency, the push for de-dollarisation and settling trade in national currencies is gaining momentum. This trend is a direct response to unilateral sanctions and could become a force multiplier for multipolarity.

Instead of a single global security architecture, multipolarity is promoting regionalised security systems. The original five members play varying roles: Russia shapes Eurasian security; China dominates East Asian strategic calculations; India asserts influence in the Indian Ocean; Brazil and South Africa act as regional stabilisers. This decentralisation reduces global uniformity but increases regional competition, sometimes heightening local instability.

Interestingly, India is also slated to host the Quad Summit in 2026 with the US, Japan, and Australia. This provides a unique opportunity to iron out misperceptions and bridge gaps between perceived rival camps.

BRICS is not aiming to replace the existing world order but is hoping to reshape the multipolar collaborative matrix. This is a process in motion, but a potent force that will continue to strengthen as long as powerful countries resort to hypocrisy and undermine the very institutions they created. India's approach in 2026 will likely focus on bridging these divides through dialogue and pushing for the reform of existing institutions, rather than their total replacement.

Anil Trigunayat is a former Indian Ambassador to Jordan, Libya, and Malta and currently a distinguished fellow with prestigious think tanks like Vivekananda International Foundation and United Services Institute of India.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.