Conflict in Myanmar: All eyes on China

The conflict between Myanmar's armed opposition groups and the ruling military that began in February 2021 has escalated over the last week. And once again, Bangladesh is at the receiving end of intense repercussions.

As of filing this piece, the official number of Myanmar's Border Guard Police (BGP) taking refuge in Bangladesh has risen to 95, after 27 more soldiers entered Bangladesh on Monday morning, fleeing heavy gunfights between the two opposing parties. 

Two people were killed on Monday afternoon after heavy mortar shells reportedly fired from Myanmar landed and exploded inside Bangladesh on the Ghumdum border in Bandarban.

Hence, similar to the rest of the world, Bangladesh is also eagerly awaiting China's next course of action as a mediator to prevent the conflict from spiralling out of control.

Awami League General Secretary Obaidul Quader also sought China's assistance as the impact of infighting in Myanmar has spilled over into Bangladesh.

"The fighting [between the Arakan Army and Myanmar Army] is within their country. But the heavy fighting across the border is scaring people here. That is why I have sought China's intervention," said the Road Transport and Bridges Minister.

This anticipation is mainly driven by China's geographical proximity to Myanmar, coupled with its significant diplomatic ties with both democratic and military factions. 

Additionally, the presence of flagship Belt and Road Initiative projects in the country adds to the importance of China's role in resolving the situation.

Significantly, back in 2018, it also shielded Myanmar from strong UN Security Council action over a military crackdown against mainly Rohingya Muslims that the US and other countries have denounced as ethnic cleansing.

So, what exactly is China going to do this time around?

The country's economic interests, security concerns and consistent fluctuations in support amid the conflict in Rakhine suggest that China's long-term strategy may involve fragmenting the anti-junta resistance and ensuring dependence on China to maximise influence in Myanmar.

Notably, the history of China-Myanmar relations goes a long way, with Myanmar becoming the first non-socialist country in 1949 to recognise the People's Republic of China (PRC). Then, in 1960, Myanmar became the first country to resolve its boundary disputes with China; and, finally, during that same year, Myanmar became the first nation to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression with Beijing.

In 1954, the two countries also affirmed that the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" were the guiding principles underlying the development of bilateral relations. 

The fundamentals of these principles were mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and, peaceful coexistence. 

While China claims consistent adherence to these principles despite Western criticisms, in practice, China frequently attempted to exert influence in Myanmar through various means.

For example, till mid-January this year, China was involved in three negotiations of brokering peace – though for a short while – between Myanmar's State Administration Council (SAC) and ethnic armies like the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta'ang National Liberation Army.

Following the latest agreement, a Myanmar military spokesperson namely Zaw Min Tun also admitted the importance the Myanmar military regime places on its ties with China. "We will negotiate with China toward reviving cross-border trade," he said. 

China too wants that to happen, as armed conflict has caused a daily loss in bilateral trade between the two countries of about $10 million, even though the loss is more damaging for Myanmar than China.

China is the largest trading partner as well as one of the most important sources of investment for Myanmar. More and more state-owned and private Chinese enterprises have been investing in Myanmar with a focus on oil and gas exploration and production, oil and gas pipelines, hydropower and mining resource development, as well as processing and manufacturing industries.

As Myanmar's largest trading partner, China even sold the junta over $250 million in arms, before seemingly reassessing its interests in the conflict-ridden neighbouring country.

Beijing's influence also extends to various other dimensions, including issuing arrest warrants for people connected to Myanmar's military.

China spent over half of 2023 pleading with Myanmar's junta chief, Gen Min Aung Hlaing and other members of SAC to crack down on cross-border scam operations that use trafficked Chinese nationals as forced labour. 

Having received no response by September, China initiated alternative approaches to address the issue, including arresting and detaining militia leaders, along with the deployment of Chinese police to certain border areas hosting scam centres.

Persistent clashes between Myanmar's military and armed ethnic groups, despite the announcement of Chinese-brokered truces, have further raised concerns about a breakdown in the military chain of command. 

Another concern is if China has any influence over the rebels, which leads to an even bigger question that even if China opens talks again, will it really be possible for it to broker a lasting ceasefire?

Notably, China has specific interests in Rakhine, principally the protection of its transport and economic corridor between southern China and the Bay of Bengal, a key element in the Belt and Road Initiative. 

This includes the newly-built Kyaukphyu port on the Bay of Bengal, a pipeline and the planned development of road and rail links connecting the port to southern China.

Together, these give China direct access to the Bay of Bengal for the first time in history, with considerable implications for the regional balance of power.  

So, quite understandably, with renewed fighting in Rakhine, China is seeking to protect its investments in the Kyaukphyu corridor by providing substantial support for the Arakan Army, including money and arms, according to The Interpreter. 

Such support enables China to leverage its influence against the Tatmadaw while also strategically hedging its bets in the region.

Chinese support for the Arakan Army also provides other benefits, particularly in relation to India's competing Kaladan project in Rakhine. This initiative aims to establish connectivity between the Bay of Bengal and India's northeast through the construction of new port facilities in Sittwe, a river transit system, and a road to India's Mizoram state.

When completed, this would provide a direct link between the Indian Ocean and India's northeast states, which are only otherwise tenuously connected with the rest of India.    

Meanwhile, China also seems to be concerned about the refugee influx resulting from the conflict. According to the United Nations, thousands of people have been displaced by the fighting with some fleeing across the border into China.

Moreover, China in the past expressed concerns over the surge in drug production and consumption in Myanmar following the military coup.

The growth in Myanmar's drug market in the three years since the 1 February 2021 takeover is directly correlated with what observers have described as a precipitous decline in rule of law in the country.

While this decline is attributed to the junta's governance shortcomings, some junta leaders are also allegedly involved in the booming drug business. 

Early last year, assets belonging to the adult children of Myanmar's military junta leader Min Aung Hlaing were discovered by Thai officials in a drug raid in Bangkok. 

This incident brought attention to the connections between the army general and the notorious criminal arms dealer Tun Min Latt.

Furthermore, China is concerned that external actors are starting to shape events in Myanmar. 

In November 2022, reports emerged that the Burmese government in exile, represented by the National Unity Government (NUG), planned to establish an office in Washington, DC. The following month, the United States Congress approved non-lethal assistance to Myanmar's opposition via the 2023 National Defense Authorisation Act. 

This development undoubtedly angered China, and its support ever since has frequently swung like a pendulum, alternating between leaning towards the military and aligning with the rebels at different junctures.

But considering the future, what might be China's long-term strategy?

Moving forward, it may very well look to fragment the anti-junta resistance by helping individual armed groups achieve victories over limited territories in the border area in exchange for abandoning ambitions to participate in coalitions aimed at regime change. 

Because, in the long term, it has a big economic stake in Myanmar and wants to prevent it from veering towards its pro-Western democrats. 

But also in the shorter term, security interests in the country can be more tactical. 

Since Myanmar attained independence in 1948, its government has struggled to assert control over its densely forested border region.

China, as a result, worries about insecurity spilling across the 2,000km (1,250 miles) frontier between the two countries. This jeopardises its infrastructure investments, many of which run along the border, and at times flushes refugees, drugs and other contraband into China.

Hence, China may consider this conflict as a lifeline for the Myanmar army to keep itself in power, as well as a means of assuring dependence on China for all parties to the conflict and ultimately maximising Chinese influence in Myanmar.

Consequently, this course of action may propel Myanmar towards extended instability and fragmentation, all while safeguarding China's border and preserving its interests within the country.