'Africa can be the new China this century'

Jack Goldstone is an American sociologist, political scientist and historian, who has made foundational contributions to cliodynamics, economic history and political demography. He is the author or editor of 13 books and over 150 research articles and was also the first scholar to describe in detail and document the long-term cyclical relationship between global population cycles and cycles of political rebellion and revolution. 

In addition to his academic pursuits, Goldstone has contributed to government consultancy, notably chairing the National Research Council's evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programmes. 

In an interview with The Business Standard, the eminent scholar discussed the unique dynamics unfolding in Asia and the transformative impact of Africa's youth boom on the world and examined how the influx of immigrants is poised to affect America and Europe in distinct ways. Regarding the potential for a shift in the global order, he also asserted that China is unlikely to surpass the US economy or exert dominance over the entirety of Asia.

Given the current global population trends, where do you believe our focus should be?

Total population growth in the world is slowing down, but some specific groups are continuing to grow rapidly – especially the youth population in Africa, and the senior population in East Asia, Europe and North America. Our main focus should be on building the productivity of these two critical population groups: the young, especially in Africa, who will dominate the growth of the global labour force, and the ageing, whose numbers are growing throughout the world much faster than the total population.  

Indeed, the population over age 60 is growing fastest precisely in those countries where population growth is slowing or negative. So unless Africa's youth become productive and get jobs, and unless the over-60 population can work into their late 60s and early 70s, the entire world economy will be dragged down by billions of people not working or with low output.

The rapidly growing youth population of Africa, and of some parts of the Middle East and South Asia, will also fuel a long surge of migration pressures on Europe and North America; that is helpful to a degree in those countries that are ageing and losing population. But it is not good if the flow of migrants becomes a fearful flood. That is best mitigated by supporting jobs and opportunities within countries with large youth populations.

Finally, those countries that today still have rapid population growth (over 1.5% per year) would benefit from making progress in their demographic transition, moving toward lower birth rates, fewer dependents, and more people of prime work age as a fraction of their total population.  

That does not require aggressive government programmes to reduce births.  Rather, what is needed are programmes to support women's health, education, and reproductive rights. These things naturally lead women to choose to have fewer children, both so that they can work and so they can invest more in the education and health of each of their children.

Can we delve into the dynamics between ageing superpowers and youthful but relatively poor or developing nations in Asia? How is this juxtaposition influencing economic and geopolitical landscapes?

This question already reveals how fast global demographics are changing. It is hardly correct any more to speak of ageing superpowers vs "youthful but relatively poor or developing nations in Asia."  

China is an Asian superpower but is ageing fast. By 2040, one-third of China's population will be over age 60. India and Indonesia, "relatively poor or developing nations," have already reduced their fertility rates to replacement levels (about 2.1 children per woman) and have also begun ageing. Though still fairly youthful, by 2050 in both India and Indonesia one person in five will be over age 60.   

Today, 43% of India's population is under 25 years of age; in 10 years that will drop to 37%, and 20 years from now it will be just 33%. And the absolute numbers are falling as well: India's under-25 population is falling from 610 million today to 573 million in 2033 and 539 million in 2043.

So India's youth population is already falling, and the total working-age population (those aged 20-64) will peak in 2050 [and] then decline. In Indonesia, the peak in the working-age population will be a couple of years earlier, in 2048 (these are all based on the latest projections from the UNDP, medium variant scenario).  

The East and South Asian countries that are truly "youthful but relatively poor" are quite a few: those countries that today have more than one-quarter of their population under age 15 are Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Timor-Leste. The real outliers here are Pakistan (37%) and Afghanistan (43%); Bangladesh just barely makes this group (26%) and will probably exit next year.

Here is how this is affecting the economic and geopolitical landscapes:  The "younger" countries mentioned will continue to send workers to other countries in Asia and the Middle East, spurring continued growth of South-South migration. China, which aspires to dominate Asia and match or exceed the global power and influence of the United States, is facing the powerful headwinds of a rapidly ageing population and shrinking workforce. Its economy is bound to slow and perhaps even shrink in the coming decades.   

Efforts to change this, such as Xi Jinping's call for more women to leave the workforce to have children, are unlikely to have much effect. This could lead to one of two outcomes: either China set aside some of its grander geopolitical ambitions to focus on stimulating its economy through major reforms to raise productivity, such as boosting the private sector, allowing inefficient firms to go bankrupt, and distributing credit on a more market and profit-based scheme. Or China ramp up its geopolitical ambitions and actions at this moment to rally support for the regime and take advantage of the strength it has now before its declining workforce and ageing population really start to undermine its strength.  

We cannot be sure what China will do, but Xi Jinping's statements seem to favour the latter choice. If so, China will be more aggressive and dangerous as it weakens – a wounded tiger if you will. Last, the "ageing superpowers" – China, Japan, Europe, Russia and the United States – will want to reduce their spending and their current debts as their own populations age and stagnate.  

So they would prefer to avoid wars if at all possible. They may turn inward, resisting immigration and regulating trade; that is the current tendency.  Or, if more enlightened, they may embrace immigration and international trade as the best way to boost their slowing economies and provide young workers.   

Again, we don't know which way this will go, but turning inward is more attractive in a world of uncertainty and conflict. It will take better international relations and more stability for ageing superpowers to return to more open immigration and international trade.

With Africa projected to become the most youthful continent by 2050, with every one in four people on the planet being African, how do you foresee this impacting the global economy and political dynamics? 

This will have a huge impact.  

First, the future of the global labour force, and much youth culture and youth consumption, will be increasingly African. Countries that accept this and adjust to it can thrive; countries that ignore this or resist this will stagnate.  

Second, the entire world has a stake in seeing Africa's youth succeed in becoming productive workers and consumers; without them, the world economy will grind to a halt as all other regions have ageing populations and stagnant or shrinking workforces.  

Third, Africa is likely to both suffer the most from climate change and be the most critical frontier for creating a wholly green economy. The suffering from climate change will spur migration and require governments to gain the capacity to be resilient, [and be] able to move resources and people as needed to cope with climate change and climate crises.  

For the world as a whole, as Africa's population doubles or more in size, while also seeing increasing demand for energy per person, Africa's increase in energy consumption can undermine all efforts at stabilising global temperatures if Africans rely mainly on fossil fuels to support this growth.  

If Earth's climate is to be stabilised, Africa's much-needed growth in energy consumption will have to be met with a mix that is relatively high in renewable energy sources.

What effects can be anticipated in Europe and America due to the increasing influx of immigrants in the forthcoming decades?

Immigration has two parts – entry and integration. 

Some European countries have handled entry fairly well, but have managed integration very poorly. Sweden, Belgium and France are examples of this. Failure to integrate immigrants has led to their children, though born in their new countries and being citizens, feeling excluded and turning to criminal and even terrorist actions.  

Other countries have done well with integration in the past, but are now struggling with entry—the US is an example of this, perhaps Canada too for this year. There is no question that with the still high population growth in Africa, parts of the Middle East, and parts of South Asia, there will be a long-term increase in the numbers seeking to migrate to America and Europe.  

Whether this is a good or bad thing depends not on the number of immigrants, but on how the entry is regulated and how well integration proceeds. I am somewhat optimistic that Europe and America are learning lessons on how to regulate entry, including setting up processing centres abroad and learning more about successful integration.  

I hope that if these lessons are applied, the increasing influx of immigrants will be a clear benefit for Europe and America, and a win-win for immigrants too.

Can you please paint us a picture of the world in 2050 based on current population trends? What steps should countries and organisations take to prepare for this future? Also, should we anticipate a shift in the world order? 

Well, for a full picture, I advise you to wait for the publication of my book 12 Billion – How Population Will Change the World in the 21^st Century and what we must do to secure our prosperity, democracy and the environment, which should be out late next year.   

But for the time being, a few things are certain. Africa will be larger, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia will be smaller, and some European countries (Italy, Spain, Hungary) will be smaller as well. The number of people over age 60 around the world, and especially in East Asia, will be unprecedented.  

The climate, I fear, will be far more unstable, creating heat waves, droughts and floods around the world that will impact even more people. Some entire regions – low-lying islands, the shores of drying-up lakes, valleys below fast-melting glaciers, and low-lying coastal areas – will have to be abandoned. 

That said, demography is not destiny. Demographic trends pose inescapable challenges, but we have the choice of how to respond to those challenges, whether with skill and foresight or with denial and neglect.  

If we react with skill and foresight, then in 2050 African countries will be the world's most dynamic economies, fueled by the rapid productivity growth of its youthful and fast-growing population. African countries can, if enough of them succeed, be the new China for the rest of the 21^st century, powering the world economy through expanded production and consumption.  

I can see a future where seniors and retirees from Europe and  North America travel to Africa for retirement and medical care with warmer weather, more support workers, and less expensive hospitals, much as previous generations in the US went to Arizona, Florida, Mexico and Panama, and Europeans from northern to southern Europe.  

That reduces the fiscal burden of caring for seniors in rich countries and adds to the economy of developing nations. Many poor countries in Asia – India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam – are making rapid strides to becoming middle-income economies. And by 2050, though the climate will be more unstable and severe, the air and water will be cleaner as countries have moved toward a large majority of their energy coming from "green" energy sources.

At the same time, I can see a world where demographic change, like climate change, is treated as a problem for the distant future and not important enough to address today. If that is what happens, then by 2050 Africa will be overflowing with ideologically extreme and underemployed youth, political instability and climate crisis will lead to frequent surges of migration from Africa and South Asia heading toward Europe, Australia and North America.  

The climate will continue to deteriorate even more severely, and the rich economies (including China) will falter badly as they face a huge increase in the number of elderly for whom they are not able to provide work, support or adequate care. 

If India, Indonesia, and other Asian countries are not able to place women in the workforce and increase the education and productivity of their workers, then their efforts to leap forward in development will be stymied by their ageing workforces and shrinking youth populations.

In short, the world in 2050 may be great or grim, depending on how countries respond to the challenges of their own populations and the global trends in population change.

And lastly, as far as the topic of a shift in the world order is concerned, China will not overtake the US economy, nor dominate all of Asia, as I expect other Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines) to enjoy more economic growth in the coming decades, while Chinese growth slows dramatically.