How did things go so bad so fast in Afghanistan?

Is This a 'Last Chopper Out of Saigon' Moment for Afghanistan?

How did things get so bad, so fast? 

The Taliban is sweeping aside Afghan defense forces at an alarming rate—so fast, we've had to update this newsletter multiple times to keep pace. Publicly, Biden administration officials are clinging to calls for peace negotiations and threatening the Taliban with international isolation if it takes the country by force.

Where things stand today. Behind the scenes, current and former officials tell SitRep they are stunned by the rapid Taliban advance and say any hopes for peace talks are gone. US intelligence assessments are now reportedly predicting Kabul could fall in 90 days, making previously reported assessments that Kabul could fall in six to 12 months seem rosy by comparison.

Ten of Afghanistan's provincial capitals have fallen to the Taliban. The US Embassy in Kabul is planning to reduce its footprint in the coming weeks—coupled with a brief troop surge to facilitate—and is reportedly considering a full evacuation if the situation deteriorates further. The picture makes Vietnam comparisons—especially the dreaded "last chopper out of Saigon" moment—uncomfortably close.

As 20 years and $2 trillion of war and nation building seem to be going up in smoke in the course of weeks, there will be plenty of autopsies written on the US War in Afghanistan. We won't try to tackle those in one single newsletter. Instead, we've collated some bite-size takeaways from interviews with current and former US and Afghan officials and experts about how things got so bad so fast.

Corruption at the core. Back in March, a top US lawmaker, Rep. Stephen Lynch, told us that corruption in the Afghan government is "as big a threat" as the Taliban, and we're seeing that play out in real time on the battlefield today.

As Lynne O'Donnell reports for FP from Kabul this week, "[t]he Ministries of Defense and Interior are notoriously corrupt, and the experts also cite widespread ineptitude, lack of leadership, and self-interest" in the rapid collapse of Afghan security forces. Just two examples O'Donnell cites: Some Afghan police haven't been paid for months, while sorely-needed ammunition and food deliveries are pilfered before they reach soldiers.

Afghan Air Force and special forces are holding the line. Even as regular Afghan defense forces seem to melt away in the face of Taliban offensives, officials and experts agree that it's the Afghan special forces and Afghan Air Force preventing these retreats from turning into a full-fledged route.

But the Air Force is stretched thin. In a video conference interview late last month with SitRep and other reporters, several Afghan lawmakers begged for more support for the Afghan Air Force, saying about one-third of the fleet of 160 aircraft were inoperable, thanks in large part to the departure of Pentagon contractors.

Naheed Farid, a lawmaker from Herat, said at the time, "If those aircraft cannot fly and cannot target the gatherings of Taliban, and then the Taliban become stronger and they storm into the cities, they will create a terrible situation." On Thursday, the Taliban conquered Herat, Afghanistan's third-largest city.

The loss of contractors is key. Along with the withdrawal of US and NATO troops, thousands of contractors who supported coalition and Afghan forces also left. They didn't make the headlines, but officials say they were effectively the logistical backbone of a functioning Afghan military. Without them, all the things that keep a military functioning—supply chain management, training, equipment maintenance—are significantly hindered.

The last pieces of leverage the US has over the Taliban is weak, at best. The latest threat the Biden administration is waiving over the Taliban's head is one of "international isolation" if it takes power by force. Still, while weak, it's not an entirely useless threat; the Taliban has been courting regional powers and trying to portray itself as a legitimate international actor.

"It's not surprising that the US is leaning very heavily on this talking point, because that's what it has left to lean on," Laurel Miller of the International Crisis Group told SitRep. "But I don't expect it to be a very powerful form of leverage … in a context where what the Taliban is fighting for first and foremost is power."

There are other retaliatory measures the United States and its allies can take to punish the Taliban for its use of force and human rights abuses, such as revoking international travel waivers, cutting US aid to Afghanistan, and sanctions. But every expert and official we spoke to agrees that not even the heaviest sanctions will convince the Taliban to halt their offensive, especially when they have the momentum.

 Robbie Gramer, a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy

Disclaimer: This article first appeared on Foreign Policy, and is published by special syndication arrangement.