The ongoing purge must have been a sudden blow to the casino kingpins.
And it is all made to seem like the authorities have suddenly become aware of the illegal business and the riches that flow into gambling, which can't be the case.
They had been running the unlawful casino business for quite a few years and making huge fortunes. Police were aware of it. A number of newspapers earlier published reports on gambling in those casinos housed in most of the sporting clubs in the capital.
But the law enforcers refrained from taking any action. The reason was simple. The ruling party men were behind the booming gambling business. Some police officials were also the alleged beneficiary of it.
Other authorities also kept their eyes closed.
Neither the National Board of Revenue nor the Anti-Corruption Commission, or the Bangladesh Bank made any move to scrutinise the kingpins' source of incomes and question the transactions of billions of taka in the banking channel by them.
Suddenly the scenario has changed. The police began the crackdown only after the prime minister had ordered them to do it. They are now nabbing the casino kingpins who had been "above" the law for long time. And all other authorities became active with their responsibilities.
The chain of actions by the respective government bodies exposes a faulty system to curb corruption and crimes.
This also raised questions about the fate of the ongoing crackdown as it is not possible to fight corruption with corruption.
Crackdown against the corrupt is nothing new in Bangladesh. But the coercive drives engaging the law enforcement agencies could not produce long lasting results.
The reasons themselves are explanatory. Instead of strengthening institutions and increasing preventive measures to fight crimes and graft, the successive governments have opted for periodic coercive measures to curb the menace. The shortcut approach failed to produce a lasting impact.
The coercive measures put the corrupt suspects and criminals on the back foot temporarily. They returned with vigour after the crackdowns were either over or lost momentum.
Some examples will make things clear.
The law enforcement agencies launched a drive in May last year to fight dangerous drug Yaba invasion as the country was flooded with the pink pills.
At least 373 suspected drug peddlers were killed in reported cross fires, or gunfights or found dead in the drives triggering huge criticism at home and abroad for extra-judicial killings.
But Yaba still keeps crossing the border to enter Bangladesh from Myanmar. In last one year since beginning of the drive the law enforcement agencies seized 1.64 crore pieces of the pink pills in the first six months of this year.
Nobody knows how much entered the country as it is thought that only 10 percent of the drug could be captured and 90 percent flowed into the market.
The drive is still on though in a limited scale. The seizure of the crazy pills means the traders are still active in smuggling into the deadly drug.
Alleged involvement of ruling party men and many police personnel with the trade makes it difficult to stop the business.
Take another example.
Winning a landslide, the BNP-led alliance formed the government in 2001. But immediately after the polls, the BNP men launched massive violent attacks on minority communities in some parts of the country. The BNP government miserably failed to contain it.
Later, unruly behaviour and wrongdoings by the party men compelled the government to launch the much-talked-about army led "Operation Clean Heart" to contain the downslide of the law and order.
The three-month long crackdown ended in January 2003 leaving so far 50 people dead. Many BNP men were also detained in the drive.
But the impact was short-lived.
The rise of the alternative power house Hawa Bhaban, rise of Islamic militants under patronisation of some BNP ministers, lawmakers and police, the countrywide serial bomb blasts by militants, unbridled extortion and tender manipulation by then ruling BNP men were among others salient features of the BNP regime.
Murder of former finance minister Shah AMS Kibria, lawmaker Ahsanullah Master and some other opposition leaders and finally the August 21 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina's rally, which was masterminded by some BNP ministers, leaders and senior intelligence officials, made the rule of law a mockery.
Lastly, the desperation to cling to power by manipulating the general election gave birth to a political turmoil that led to the declaration of the state of emergency in January 2007.
The political changeover flickered a ray of hope in the public minds.
The interim government launched a crackdown on corrupt suspects and criminals.
In the army-led joint forces crackdown, many political bigwigs were detained, put behind the bars on charge of corruption.
In the run-up to the December 2008 polls, the Awami League promised people to take stern actions against corruption, crimes, extortion and all sorts of wrongdoings. The party came up with almost the same promises in the run-up to the 2014 and 2018 polls.
The party won all the three polls and formed the government and has been running the country since 2009.
But the ongoing crackdown against the casino kingpins and tender mafia exposes the deterioration of the overall situation. It also proved the crackdown during the emergency regime was short-lived.
The crucial questions are: Why was the impact of the Operation Clean Heart, the army-led joint forces sweeping drive during the emergency regime not sustained? And will the drive against crazy Yaba pills and the casino kingpins and tender manipulators yield long-lasting results?
Given the present poor state of the major institutions like parliament, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the police administration, it is not easy to be hopeful about any long-lasting impact of the drives.
The quality of the functions of parliament keeps deteriorating. Constitutionally, the cabinet for its functions is collectively accountable to parliament. But the reality shows something opposite.
The House cannot effectively oversee whether the ministries or other government departments perform properly. The absence of an effective opposition in parliament since 2014 aggravated the situation. Thus, the most vital instrument to ensuring check and balance in the state powers remains largely ineffective.
The story of the Anti-Corruption Commission is also appalling. Formed in 2004, the anti-graft body was seen hyperactive for two years during the emergency regime.
During the rest of its lifespan, the anti-graft body could not make any difference. It was dubbed a "toothless and clawless" tiger.
Considered as the crime buster, the police force has been made unable to act independently due to excessive politicisation over the years. The force was abused by successive governments against the opposition parties and harass their leaders.
In addition, many of their alleged involvement in unlawful casino business, Yaba trade and other wrongdoings damaged the morality of the force.
The judiciary alone cannot make much difference. It is overburdened with a backlog of around 34 lakh pending cases. The judiciary is considered as one of the vital arms to fight crimes and corruption. But successive governments took few steps to strengthen the judicial branch.
The accumulative results of the poor state of the House, the anti-graft body and the police administration reflect in the global indices.
Bangladesh has been ranking at the bottom on the corruption perception index by the Transparency International for the last 18 years.
The corruption makes the business climate difficult. Therefore, the country has been performing poorly on the World Bank's ease of doing business index for a decade.
One thing seems certain that making the vital institutions almost ineffective only eases the way for the corrupt and criminals to indulge in graft and wrongdoing.
And the weakness in the vital institutions stands in the way to Bangladesh becoming an upper-middle income country by 2030.
The important question is: How will the ongoing drives against crime and corruption be effective and produce long-lasting impact?
The above instances also suggest we never learn.